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N a free democracy such as ours, one of the most difficult problems
will always be to maintain a nice balance between non-encroachment
on our freedoms, and the preservation of the government which pro-
tects those freedoms. Abraham Lincoln has well expressed this dilem-
ma as follows:
"Must a government of necessity be too strong for the lib-
erties of its people, or too weak to maintain its own existence."'
This fundamental dilemma is exemplified in the struggle for ascend-
ancy, from the first World War until the second, between two doctrines
of constitutional law: (1) the "clear and present danger" doctrine,
sometimes called the "Holmes" doctrine, to the effect that civil lib-
erties cannot be denied to subversive movements, unless and until
those movements are seen to be on the verge of success; and (2) the
"self-defense" doctrine, to the effect that the constitution, for its own
protection, withdraws the benefits of its guarantees of civil liberties
from those who seek to overthrow it.
The object of this present paper is to trace the constitutional history
of the ups and down of these two competing doctrines, in opinions, both
majority and dissenting, of the Supreme Court of the United States.
The "self-defense" doctrine is the more ancient of the two. Justice
Frankfurter 2 traces it back to Abraham Lincoln's message of July 4,
1861, to a special session of the Congress, when in reply to an accusa-
tion that he had illegally suspended the writ of habeas corpus, the
President asserted that the Federal Government must be preserved,
even if that preservation necessitates that
"some single law, made in such extreme tenderness of the citi-
zen's liberty that practically it relieves more of the guilty than
of the innocent, should to a very limited extent be violated."'
*Member of Wisconsin Bar; Author of several law books, including "Consti-
tutional Conventions" (Little-Brown); formerly Assistant Attorney General
of Massachusetts; member of the faculty of the Marquette Graduate School of
Engineering, and Attorney for Bucyrus-Erie Company of South Milwaukee.
'Minersville v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 596 (1940). Justice Frankfurter gives no
citation for this quotation. Cf. note 3, infra.2 Dissenting opinion in Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 62 S.Ct. 190 (1941)
203.
8 Richardson, "Messages and Papers of the Presidents." 1908 ed., Vol. VI, p. 25.
SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES
It is generally agreed that the "clear and present danger" doctrine
originated in the following dictum by Justice Holmes in the Schenck
case in 1918:
"The question in every case is whether the words are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils that Congress has a right to prevent.' 4
It is important that we note the following facts about this obscure
sentence. It occurs in a unanimous opinion. It was wholly unnecessary
to the decision of the case, inasmuch as the conviction of Schenck for
attempting to cause insubordination and obstruct the draft was sus-
tained by the Court. Furthermore the context leads to the conclusion
that these words were employed as a species of "thinking out loud," a
sort of "on the one hand... ; but on the other .... "
Whether they were noticed at all by the other members of the
Court, who were unanimously agreed that Schenck should be convicted,
doctrine or no doctrine, will probably never be known.
It would not be seemly to accuse Justice Holmes of inserting those
words into that opinion as what fiction-writers call a "plant," but the
fact remains that later on they proved very handy for that purpose.
At any rate the thought contained in those words was not raised again
by Justice Holmes in his opinions sustaining the convictions of
Frohwerk5 and of Debs,6 on the authority of the Schenck case, nor
even in his dissent in the Stilson case,7 in which dissent Justice Brandeis
joined.
But, in 1919, in Justice Holme's dissenting opinion in the Abrans
case, in which opinion Justice Brandies joined, the doctrine is casually
alluded to in the following words:
"I do not doubt for a moment that by the same reason that
would justify punishing persuasion to murder, the United States
constitutionally may punish speech that produces or is intended
to produce a clear and imminent danger that it will bring about
forthwith certain substantive evils that the United States con-
stitutionally may seek to prevent.""
This is an even more moderate statement of the doctrine than
Justice Holmes's original statement of it, for note the-words: "or is
intended to produce," words later forgotten or repudiated by him.
In 1920, in the majority opinion of Justice McKenna in the Schaefer
case, we find an explicit assertion of the competing "self-defense" doc-
4 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52, 63 L.Ed. 470 (1918).
5 Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 63 L.Ed. 560 (1918).
6 Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 63 L.Ed. 566 (1918).
7 Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 589, 63 L.Ed. 1154 (1919).8 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627, 63 L.Ed. 1173 (1919).
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trine, which had been implicit in the Schenck, Frohwerk, Debs, Stilson
and Abrams opinions. The Court now stated:
"A curious spectacle was presented: that great ordinance of
government and orderly liberty was invoked to justify the activi-
ties of anarchy or of the enemies of the United States, and by a
strange perversion of its precepts it was adduced against itself.
... Verdicts and judgments of conviction were the reply to the
challenge, and when they were brought here our response to
it was unhesitating and direct. We did more than reject the
contention; we forestalled all shades of repetition of it including
that in the case at the bar."
'
So they thought. Their assertion of that doctrine made it wholly
unnecessary for the majority to dignify even by rebuttal the assertion
of the "clear and present danger" doctrine in the dissent in that case
by Justice Brandeis, Holmes concurring, in which the astonishing
statement is made that in the Schenck case "the extent to which Con-
gress may, under the Constitution, interfere with free speech was ...
declared by a unanimous court to be" this alleged doctrine !'o Brandeis
and Holmes then proceed to base their entire dissent categorically on
a demonstration that Schaefer's subversive publications created no clear
and present danger.
Later that same year, in the Pierce case, Justice Brandeis (Holmes
concurring) again asserted the "clear and present danger" doctrine,"
and again the majority merely ignored it.
In the Gilbert case late in 1920, Justice McKenna, speaking for the
majority of the Court, including Justice Holmes, reasserted the "self-
defense" doctrine. After citing a number of prior opinions, from
Schenck down to Abrams, Justice McKenna said:
"In Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, commenting on
those cases and their contentions it was said that the curious
spectacle was presented of the Constitution of the United States
being invoked to justify the activities of anarchy or of the ene-
mies of the United States, and by a strange perversion of its
precepts it was adduced against itself. And we did more than
reject the contention, we forestalled all repetitions of it, and the
contention in the case at bar is a repetition of it.' 12
Chief Justice White dissented on merely a point of jurisdiction.
Justice Brandeis alone dissented on the merits13 ; and it is to be noted
that, now that for the first time Justice Holmes was on the other side
of the fence, there is no mention of the "clear and present danger"
9 Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 477, 64 L.Ed. 360 (1919).
10 Schaefer v. United States, supra, 482.
"1 Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 255, 64 L.Ed. 542 (1919).
12 Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 332, 65 L.Ed. 287 (1920).
'3 Id., at 334.
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doctrine. May not this occurrence absolve Mr. Brandeis from responsi-
bility for that doctrine?
This brings us down to 1925, up to which time the "self-defense"
doctrine had been categorically asserted in two majority opinions, and
had been implicit in at least five more, and had not up to then been
explicitly questioned even in a dissent. We find that the "clear and
present danger" doctrine had been asserted in one dictum (written by
Justice Holmes) and in three Holmes-Brandeis dissents; but even
this slight recognition had brought the alleged doctrine to the point
where it could not longer be ignored by the rest of the Court; it became
incumbent upon the majority to scotch it. Accordingly, in the Gitlow
case, the majority opinion by Justice Sanford quotes with approval the
following from the Supreme Court of Illinois:
"Manifestly, the legislature has authority to forbid the advo-
cacy of a doctrine designed and intended to overthrow the gov-
ernment, without waiting until there is a present and imminent
danger of the success of the plan advocated. If the State were
compelled to wait until the apprehended danger became certain,
then its right to protect itself would come into being simulta-
neously with the overthrow of the government, when there
would be neither prosecuting officers nor courts for the enforce-
ment of the law."14
And, he further says:
"That utterances inciting to the overthrow of organized gov-
ernment by unlawful means, present a sufficient danger of sub-
stantive evil to bring their punishment within the range of legis-
lative discretion, is clear .... And the immediate danger is none
the less real and substantial, because the effect of a given utter-
ance cannot be accurately foreseen .... A single revolutionary
spark may kindle a fire that, smoldering for a time, may burst
into a sweeping and destructive conflagration. It cannot be said
that the State is acting arbitrarily or unreasonably when in the
exercise of its judgment as to the measures necessary to pro-
tect the public peace and safety, it seeks to extinguish the spark
without waiting until it has enkindled the flame or blazed into
the conflagration. It cannot reasonably be required to defer the
adoption of measures for its own peace and safety until the
revolutionary utterances lead to actual disturbances of the pub-
lic peace or imminent and immediate danger of its own destruc-
tion; but it may, in the exercise of its judgment, suppress the
threatened danger in its incipiency."'15
Justice Holmes and Brandeis, in their dissent,15a again assert the
doctrine refuted by the above quotations from the majority. Their in-
14 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 669-670, 69 L.Ed. 1138 (1924) quoting
People v. Lloyd, 304 Ill. 23, 35 (1924).
15 Id., at 669.
i5a Id., at 672.
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sistence that this doctrine had the unanimous sanction of the Court in
the Schenck case, required some reply.
This reply consisted in distinguishing the Schenck case, rather than
in dignifying the alleged "clear and present danger" doctrine by over-
ruling it. Justice Sanford stated that the sentence which Justice Holmes
had inserted in the Schenck case,
"has no application to those like the present, where the legis-
lative body itself has previously determined the danger of sub-
stantive evil arising from utterances of a specified character."'16
Subsequent developments cast doubt on the tactical wisdom of
Justice Sanford's not dismissing the Hughes interpolation as a mere
inadvertent dictum of the Schenck case, rather than to have resorted
to this somewhat labored attempt at distinguishment.
The Whitney case in 1927 afforded Justices Holmes and Brandeis
an opportunity to attack the Gitlow opinion on two fronts, with a
pincers movement. Their specially concurring opinion17: (a) relied on
the fact that the Gitlow case had merely distinguished the Schenck dic-
tum; and (b) invented a new doctrine to combat the ground of dis-
tinguishment. This new doctrine was that a legislative determination
that certain acts are dangerous, must be disregarded unless the Court
finds that these acts actually are dangerous. The two dissenters even
tried to add a new limitation to the "clear and present danger" doc-
trine, namely that the danger must also be serious. Thus they sought
not only to limit the applicability of the Gitlow decision, but also to
weaken it in cases to which it was applicable. And all under the guise
of a concurrence!
Such persistence certainly deserves to be rewarded. Yet, up until
1936 there had never been a majority reliance upon the "clear and
present danger" doctrine, so often asserted by Holmes and Brandeis,
and by them alone; a doctrine once completely and logically demolished
by the majority, a doctrine utterly inconsistent with the twice-asserted
majority "self-defense" doctrine.
In the Stromberg case in 1931, although a conviction under a red
flag law was reversed, the majority opinion by Justice Hughes reiter-
ated the "self-defense" doctrine in the following words:
"There is no question but that the State may thus provide for
the punishment of those who indulge in utterances which incite
to violence and crime and threaten the overthrow of organized
government by unlawful means. There is no constitutional im-
munity for such conduct abhorrent to our institutions.' 8
16 Gitlow v. New York, s , ra, 671.
17 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372, 71 L.Ed. 1095 (1926).
Is Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368-369, 75 L.Ed. 1117 (1930).
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There was no mentioff of the "clear and present danger" doctrine
in this case, nor in three others of about the same period to which it
might have been pertinent.19
In the first Herndon case, Justice Cardozo mentioned the doctrine
in a dissent.2 0
Finally, in 1937, nineteen years after its first assertion, the "clear
and present danger" doctrine first received majority reliance, not how-
ever in a case involving either national defense or an attempt at over-
throwing the government,-but rather one merely involving the preach-
ing of race-equality to negroes.21 Even this case does not overrule the
Gitlow case, but reasserts the two principles there asserted; Pnd, in at
last dignifying the Schenck dictum as a principle of law, does so by
merely distinguishing the Gitlow dictum as it in turn had distinguished
the Schenck dictum. As the writer interprets the distinguishment in
the Herndon case, it is that Herndon was not trying to overthrow the
government. The second pincer of the Holmes-Brandeis specially con-
curring opinion in the Whitney case, namely that the court can go
behind a legislative determination of imminent danger, still has not
been dignified by majority support. In fact, recent decisions in other
fields seem to bar out this possibility.
Since the initial majority recognition of the "clear and present
danger" doctrine in the second Herndon case, it has been reasserted
only five times, one of them a dissent, and all in fields remote from
the field of national defense in which Justice Holmes so often futilely
tried to establish it. Three of these five instances related to peaceful
picketing,22 one to the distribution of religious tracts (alleged to be
likely to disturb the peace) ,23 and one to contempt of court.24
It was not asserted in the handbill cases,25 nor in the Jersey City
free speech case,2' nor in the flag-salute case, 27 nor even in Justice
Stone's lone disent in the latter, though it may perhaps be considered
implicit in his concluding sentence. 2s
9 Burns v. United States, 274 U.S. 328 (1927) ; Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380(1927); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937). In the Burns case, Justice
Brandeis alone dissented, and did not raise the point; thus again supplying
evidence that the "clear and present danger" doctrine was merely a Holmes
idea.
2o Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441, 447 (1935).
2" Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 256, 81 L.Ed. 1066 (1936).
22 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940) ; American Federation of Labor
v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 325 (1941); Justice Blacks dissent in Milk Wagon
Drivers U. v. Meadowmoor, 312 U.S. 287, 313 (1941).
23 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940).
24 Bridges v. California, 62 S.Ct. 190, 203 (1941).25 Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) ; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
26 Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
27 Minersville v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
28 Ibid.
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In the Bridges case, handed down the day after "Pearl Harbor,"
but too soon to have been influenced thereby, we can note what may be
the beginning of a new trend. Justice Frankfurter, is now the dissenter,
and against the "clear and present danger" doctrine. He says:
"Free speech is not so absolute or irrational a conception as
to imply paralysis of the means for effective protection of all
the freedoms secured by the Bill of Rights. . . . In the cases
before us, the claims on behalf of freedom of speech and of the
press encounter claims on behalf of liberties no less precious.
California asserts her right to do what she has done as a means
of safeguarding her system of justice. 29
He is joined by the strongest members of the Court: Chief Justice
Stone, and Justices Roberts and Byrnes. Is it not likely that this
Frankfurter dissent may lay the foundation for the eventual repudia-
tion of this doctrine?
From all the foregoing, we can draw the following conclusions:
1. The "self-defense" doctrine is well-established, and has never
been directly attacked, even in a dissent.
2. The "clear and present danger" doctrine has never been relied
on by the Court to overturn a conviction in a case involving an attempt
to subvert the government, or opposition to national defense.
3. The majority has applied it only five times: once in a case
involving propaganda of race equality, twice in picketing cases, once
in a case involving distribution of literature, and once in a case involv-
ing contempt of court.
4. The latest time that it has been applied, it prevailed in a mere
five-to-four decision, the dissenters being the strongest members of
the Court, headed by that great liberal, Justice Frankfurter.
5. The complete refutation of the doctrine by Justice Sanford
in the Gitlow case has never been answered, in fact no attempt has
ever been made to answer it.
6. The "clear and present danger" doctrine is utterly inconsistent
with the well-established "self-defense" doctrine.
7. It may be considered to have reached its height just before
Pearl Harbor, and now to be on its way out.
Shortly after the formulation of the Constitution of the United
States, and before the result had been made public, Benjamin Franklin
was asked by a Philadelphia lady whether "we had a monarchy or a
republic." He replied: "A republic, if you can keep it."' 0
Is not the answer to the proponents of the "clear and present
danger" doctrine: "What good are civil liberties, if we are unwilling
to qualify them in order to keep them ?"
29 Bridges v. California, supra, 596.
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